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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES C. KNIGHT and BEATRICE· M. 
KNIGHT, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a 
corporation and OGDEN RIVER WATE·R 
USERS ASSOCIATION, a corporation, 
Defendants and .A.p·p·ellants. 
RESPONDENTS' SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT 
OF FACTS 
As we believe appellants' statement is insuffcient 
to a proper understanding of this case we are under the 
necessity of supplementing it. Here, as in appellants' 
brief, the respondents and appellants will be respectively 
designated plaintiffs and defendants. 
The pipe line here involved was constructed pur-
suant to a three party contract (plaintiffs' Exhibit B, 
T. 131) bet,veen the defendants and the United States 
of America. The contract provides that the new pipe 
be c.onstructed on the Povver Company's R. 0. W. and 
"to the alignment and gTades of the Company's p-resent 
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pipe line,'' and that ''in general, the new wood stave 
pipe line, where plaeed on the original located line, will 
be buried in the same manner as the present pipe line 
of the Company." (Exhibit B, paragraph 5, and con-
tract ''Exhibit B'' thereto attached.) All plans were 
subject to the approval of the Power Company. (Ibid.) 
and work was to be done to its satisfaction. Defendants, 
under the contract, operated and maintained the new 
line jointly .. (Ibid., paragraph 17.) 
Experience over the past thirty-five years (as far 
back as the recollection of any witness goes) is that fre-
quently in Ogden Canyon, especially at the time of 
the spring thaws, rocks and boulders on the sides of 
Ogden Canyon are loosened by the forces of nature and 
particularly by the action of moisture freezing and 
melting in rotation, and roll down the canyon side 
across the pipe line situs to the bottom of the canyon. 
These vary in size from small pebbles to great boulders 
of many tons mass. (Tr. 19, 20, 22, 23, 26-29; 31-36, 37.) 
Plaintiffs produced evidence that this pipe and also 
the one it replaced had been broken in this vicinity 
by rolling rocks on several previous occasions and at· 
least onee before at substantially the same spot. 
(Tr. 22, 23; 26-29; 35, 36.) On one such occasion the 
resulting flood flowed down the road 'more than a 
thousand feet. (Tr. 39). 
Moreover, a parallel pipe line maintained by Ogden 
City for many years was subject to frequent breaks in 
the exposed portions from rocks rolling down the can-
yon side. ( Tr. 31-36.) In 1933, three years before 
Defendant's new pipe was built, the city's old surface 
pipe was replaced with a new 38" pipe which was buried 
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from one or t'vo feet below the surface of the ground. 
Thereafter, although roeks still rolled across this pipe, 
no further trouble with such breakage has been ex-
perienced. (Tr. 44--±o, 48.) 
The engineer 'vho planned the Defendants' new 
pipe g·a ve consideration to these dru1gers, but the use of 
available safety precautions, such as burying the pipe 
or using· steel pipe, 'vas limited because of the increased 
cost to defendants of such precautions. (Tr. 147, 148.) 
On the night of the break and the resulting flood 
1\Ir. -J. W. Farrell, 'vho drove up the canyon between 
6 :30 and 7 :00 p.m., was the first to see the trouble. 
(Tr. 158-9.) He met the water about 1,000 feet below 
the break, drove straig·ht through (against the current) 
and without stopping proceeded to the~ dam to get the 
·water turned off. He does not mention seeing the rock 
8~ feet long and 5 feet high which other witnesses who 
arrived later saw in the middle of the road. (Tr. 180, 
183, 184, 230.) Neither does he mention meeting Mr. 
Edward Jesperson, who, driving down th canyon (with 
the current) was stalled at the upper edge of the flood 
in water 1¥2 feet deep at first, but which rose over the 
cushions of his car before the water was stopped. He 
was stalled only 30 or 40 feet west of the C.anyon Gro-
cery. (Tr. 24.) The break apparently caused by the 
large boulder which came to rest in the road was 300 or 
400 feet uJest of the Grocery. ( Tr. 219) About 100, 
150, or 200 feet east of this break, where the pipe was 
not covered at all, two other smaller rocks had hit the 
north side of the pipeline and were found beside it. 
Defendants' employees testified that they ''had broken 
a little hole'' ( Tr. 182; 237) from. which (on the fol-
lowing morning) no ~ater was flowing. (Tr. 182~) 
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Two days after the flood Mr. Henry G. Allred and 
a companion traced its course up to that hole by the 
debris and other marks left by the water as it flowed 
down the canyon to Plaintiffs' house. They found a 
hole 3 or 4 feet long and 2 feet wide, with evidence of 
extensive water flow, and two boulders, each about 
2x2x3 feet in size lying beneath the break. ( Tr. 60-63) 
(It is Plaintiffs' eontention that this break came first 
and caused the damage and that the break emphasized 
by defendants came some time later.) He found two 
tracks, apparently of the course of the boulders, running 
down the mountainsidH to the place of this -break. (Tr. 
64, 65.) At this point the pipe is low, but west of there 
(down-canyon) it raises to go over a hump, so that 
this point would be under pressure. 
At the timH there was some sno\v banked on either 
side of the road by the snowplows of the State Road 
Commission, but not so much as shown by defendants' 
photog~raphic exhibits taken the following year. (Tr. 73-
7 4.) However, this was the normal condition of the 
road in winter; it was common knowledge, and Defend-
ants knew that this road was ploughed out every winter. 
(Tr. 245-246.) 
According to the contract Exhibit B (second page 
of ''Exhibit B '' attached thereto) the designed capacity 
of the pipeline is at least 320 c.f.s.; although Mr. Jones, 
the Power Company's superintendent, said it was 280 
c.f.s. (Tr. 255.) At the time of the break it was carrying 
about one-ha.lf its capacity. (Tr. 255.) 
Plaintiffs' complaint as amended alleges negligence 
( 1) in eonstructing such a pipe on the surface of the 
ground unprotected from the known dangers of rolling 
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rocks and (2) in flowing large quantities of water 
through the pipe so unprotected. (R. 002-003.)· Although 
negligence in maintenance was also alleged, the court 
submitted the case to the jury only on the questions of 
negligent construction and operation. 
It should be noted that defendants' quotation (on 
page 15 of their brief) of the court's _Instruction 9 is 
erroneous: the words ''and maintenance'' are not con-
tained in the instruction. (R. 062; Tr. 286.) 
THE ARGUMENT 
This case was presented by the respondent-plaintiffs 
and tried by the lower court upon general principles of 
negligence under which human beings are bound, in the 
conduct of their affairs, to use reasonable care to avoid 
injury from dangers which a reasonably prudent man 
would have forseen. The trial court submitted the case 
to the jury on instructions based on the decisions of this 
court carefully defining the duties and standards of care 
required of defendants in accordance with these general 
principles. By its verdict the jury in effect found that 
a reasonable prudent man would, under all the circum-
stances, have foreseen _the danger which in fact materri-
alized, and that defendants failed to take reasonable 
precautions to avoid damage to the plaintiffs resulting 
therefrom, and further, that the damage resulted natur-
ally and proximately from that failure. As there is 
ample evidence in support of every fact necessary to 
the verdict, and the case is one at law, the verdict should 
not be disturbed. We will, however, answer in order 
the four points raised in the Appellants' brief: 
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1. The lower court did not err in overruling de-
fendants' demurrers, irn denying defenda.nts' motions jo1 
non·suit following plaintiffs' opening statement, or in 
denying defendants' motions for non-suit following com· 
pletion of plaintiffs' case in chief. 
The, defendants, itl the first section of their brief, 
attack the sufficiency of the alleged and proved facts to 
spell out negligence. 
However, it is alleged that defendants were negli-
gent (1) in so constructing the pipe upon the surface 
that it was exposed to rolling rocks which every spring 
roll down the canyon side without protection from such 
rocks, and (2) in c.oursing large quantities of water 
through the pipe when it was so unprotected. It is also 
alleged· that the defendants knew, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care should hav known of such rolling rocks. 
These allegations of course state in general terms the 
factual basis of legal negligence unless this court is 
going to hold that power and irrigation companies are 
entitled as a matt~:J1}~r.~c9?!~.!~!:!Ieams of0 water~~~~~~ 
normal forces of nature which are likely to cause the 
water to escape from its confining· pipe with disastrous 
results. We submit that is not the law, and we are 
confident the court will not so hold. Defendants are 
bound so to use their property that their neighbors will 
not be injured as a result of defendants' failure reason· 
ably to provide against forseeable hazards. 
The evidence, although not entirely without conflict, 
amply supports the allegations. Certainly the escape 
of the water from the exposed pipe, with resulting dam-
age, was forseeable by anyone, especially in the light 
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of past experieuee. There "·as evidence that this pipe 
had been previou8ly (and since 1936) broken ( T. 23) and 
that the pipe \Yhich preceded it, and which was owned 
and operated by the defendant Power Company, bad 
been broken at about the same spot, all by rolling rocks. 
(T. 26-29). 1loreover, the evidence showed without con-
flict that Ogden ('1ity 's parallel pipe-line had frequently 
suffered similar breaks from the same cause, until, some 
years prior to the construction of the defendants' pipe, 
the city's pipe was buried from one to two feet, since 
when no farther breaks have occurred. A reasonably 
prudent man, we submit, would have profited by the 
city's experience, and protected his neighbors against 
the hazard of a tremendous flow of water on the side 
of a steep canyon when he knew that rolling rocks had 
already broken similar pipelines on many occasions. 
Such dangers \vere in fact foreseen, but were ignored 
to save money. (Tr. 147-148). Surely it is not unreason~ 
able to require the defendants here to meet, in their 
pursuit of businss profit, the same standard of care as 
Ogden City. found it necessary and convenient to 'meet. 
To permit defendants so to save money and profits at 
plaintiffs' expense, would, we submit, amount to a taking 
of plaintiffs' property without due process of law and 
without fair compensation in violation of the Consti-
tution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 
1, and the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 
and Section 22. To kno,vingly expose plaintiffs' pro-
perty to so obvious and great a hazard as that here 
existing· certainly depreciates its value immediately, and 
sooner or later results in its damage and partial destruc-
tion. If defendants wanted, for reasons of economy, to 
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impose this risk on plaintiffs' land without liability, 
they should have condemned it, so that they could flood 
it with impunity after paying the value of the land. 
We think it fair to point out that in comparing the 
situation of the defendants and Ogden City the standard 
of care and the efforts reasonably to be required of de-
fendants to avoid injury to their neighbors was even 
higher than that reasonably to be required of the city. 
The degree of care required is, generally speaking, 
graduated according to the danger attendant upon the 
acts performed or instrumentality used, and the greater 
the danger the greater the care and vigilance required 
to avoid injury. 
38 Am. J ur. 677, ''Negligence,'' Section 31; 
Mackay vs. Breeze, 
72 Utah 305, 269 Pac. 1026, 1027. 
In this ease the capacity of defendants' pipe line was 
approximately four times that of the city's pipe; the 
potential flood was four times as great. Hence the de-
gree of care required of defendants would be substan-
tially greater than that required of the city. It would 
he reasonable to require defendants to assume a much 
larger financial burden in the interest of safety. 
It would seem clear that under all the circumstances 
it was negligence for defendants to course 140 c.f.s. of 
water through the unprotected pipe, at least during the 
season when rolling rocks were to be expected, and the 
submission of the case to the jury was fully justified. 
Such rocks were to be anticipated in the ordinary course 
of nature, and when defendants undertook to run a 
tremendous flow of water down the canyonside for their 
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O\Yll purposes, they \Yere under a duty to construct and 
operatP the means of accomplishing their purpose in 
a \Yay \Yhich \Yould adequately meet and cope with such 
ua tural emergencies. 
Jordan ,~. Uity of 1\lt. Pleasant 
15 l~tah -±49, 49 Pac. 7 46 
Li~ollbee Y . .Jionroe Irrig·ation Co. 
18 Utah 343, 54 Pac. 1009. 
In- the latter ca8e thi8 court carefully and clearly out-
lined the la''T of Utah applicable to such situations, and 
the trial court here followed that law. 
Defendants rely upon the case of Logan, Hyde Park 
and Smithfield Canal Co., v. Utah Power and Light Co., 
45 Utah 491, 146 Pac. 560. It is true that the situation 
there was much like the situation here, and that it was 
held that there \vas no liability there. However there 
are material and vital differences in the facts there and 
here which make that case inapplicable to the case at 
bar. We shall consider them briefly. 
First, then, in the case cited the rock in question 
was proved to have been started down the mountain by 
a human agency, by ''some person or persons who were 
strangers to the defendant' '-clearly a negligent act. 
Here it is conceded that the rocks involved were started 
by the usual and normal forces of nature. "It can be 
stated as a general rule that ordinarily the intervention 
of a neglige,ut act as the indepedent and efficient cause 
of an injury operates to relieve one who has been guilty 
of prior negligence from responsibility for the injury, 
nof.withsta11ding the condition under which the irn,.ter-
t'eni ug cause operated was created by the prior negli-
gence.'' (Italic~ added.) 
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38 Am. J ur. 729, ''Negligence'' § 72. 
Thus the defendant in the cited case was not bound to 
forsee that a human being would break its flume by 
negligently rolling a rock upon it. In this case, how-
ever, the defendants under all the circumstances were 
bound to foresee that rocks loosened by the forces of 
nature would be likely to strike and break their un-
protected pipe. It had happened repeatedly before. ''The 
view that wher a natural fore or act of God unites with 
human negligence in causing injury the negligence of 
the human agent is regarded as a condition, and not as 
a cause of the injury, is disapproved generally. The gen-
eral rule is that when the negligence of a. responsible 
pe.rson concurs with an ordinary flood, storm, or other 
natural force, or with a co-called :ac.t of God, in pro-
ducing an injury, the party guilty of such negligence 
will be held liable for the injurious consequences, if the 
injury would not have happened except for his failure 
to exercise care. '' (Italics added.) 
38 Am. Jur. 719, et seq., "Negligence"§ 65. 
Secondly, in the Canal Company case cited by de-
fendants there was no evidence that rolling rocks had 
ever before broken the pipe or flume there involved. In 
this case the evidence 'vas that this pipe and its pre-
decessor and a parrallel pipe had been repeatedly broken 
by rolling rocks, but that the parallel pipe suffered no 
further damage from rocks after it was buried. The 
background of experience in Ogden Canyon, the cir-
cumstanees against which the forseeability of injury 
must be tested in determining negligence, is in this case 
exactly the opposite of that in the cited case. Here 
there was even evidence of a previous break at this par-
10 
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tic-l,tlar po,i·nt. Has this no bearing 9n forseeability? 
The opinion in tht• previous case \Yas based in large part 
upon considern tion of the fact that no previous diffi-
culty had been experienced. The proving of the con-
trary fact here is sufficient alone to distinguish the 
cases on their facts. 
Thirdly, Og·den Canyon is heavily populated, with 
almost all available level space occupied by human habi-
tations, ""bile Logan Canyon in 1913 and earlier had 
practieally no population especially in the early spring 
when rocks most frequently roll down the canyon sides. 
That being the fact, the degree care required in con-
structing and operating a pipeline of tremendous cap-
acity do\Yn the side of Ogden Canyon is much higher, 
under the doctrine stated in Makay v. Breeze, supra, 
because the danger of injury to property and even of the 
destruction of human life to be anticipated in the latter 
case is much greater. One may reasonably take chances 
in a desert that would be unreasonable in a croweded 
city. Hence it is quite reasonable to require defendants 
to protect their pipe in Ogden Canyon, even if it be 
co1iceded that it would have been unreasonable to make 
a similar requirement for the Logan Canyon flume ~a 
generation ago. For this additional reason the case 
relied on by defendants is not applicable. 
In view of the fact that the defendants here cite 
45 C. J. 746 (736°?) to the effect that an injury resulting 
directly and proximately from an act of God is not 
recoverable, it will perhaps be helpful to the Court to 
quote from the same authority, at the same page, the 
text writer's definition of an Act of God: 
11 
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''The term 'Act of God' is used to designate the 
cause of an injury ... where such injury is due 
directly and exclusively to natural causes with-
out hu.man intervention, and could not have been 
prevented by the exercise of human care or fore-
sight, and for an injury so c.aused no one is 
liable . . . In order that this rule may apply 
the act of God must be the sole cause of an in-
jury, for if an act of God and the negligence of 
an individual are concurring causes of an injury, 
the individual who was guilty of negligence is 
liable for the injury." 
Even if we were to concede that the rolling rocks 
which released the flood in this case were acts of God 
(which we do not) still they would not have caused 
lVfr. and Mrs. Knight any damag-e had it not been for 
the defendants' negligence in conducting a tremendous 
volume of water along the hillside in an unprotected 
pipe when they knew from experience of the danger of 
breakage from rolling rocks. Their negligence neces-
sarily concurred, and they are liable. 
Before we end our consideration of the first section 
of defendants' brief we want to devote a moment to ·an 
analysis of the case of 
Howe v. West Seattle L. & I. Co., 
59 Pac. 495 (Washington), 
which was distinguished by this court in its opinion in 
the Canal Company case cited by defendants. It is, 
we submit, indistinguishable from the case at bar. There 
defendants had placed a log on a hillside. Here the 
defendants placed a large quantity of water on a hillside. 
There the defendants failed adequately to protect the 
log from being dislodged or released to roll down the 
12 
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slope. Here the defendants failed adequately to protect 
their 'Yater from being released to flow down the slope. 
There landslides had in the past come down the hill-
side. Here rocks had in the past rolled down the hill-
side-even releasing water on previous occasions. There 
another landslide dislodged the log·, which proceeded 
down the hill, causing injury. Here another rolling rock 
released the "'"ater, which proceed down . the slope, 
causing· injury. There it 'vas held proper to submit the 
case to the jury. Here also the trial court properly sub-
mitted the case to the jury. 
Under the facts proved it was p-roperly a que~stion 
for the jury to determine whether a reasonable prudent 
man would have forseen and guarded against the danger 
of water being released by rolling rocks. In the light 
of the experience in Ogden Canyon, where rocks break 
exposed pipes frequently, ac.cording to the testimony 
of the City Waterworks Department, and especially as 
there was evidence that a pipe had been so broken 
previous at this p.aint, the defendants' negligence was 
properly submitted to the jury. 
2. The lower court did not ·err in denying defend-
ants motion for a directed verdJ~ct or in refusitng de-
fendants' requested instruction Number One, w·hiah 
would have instructed the jury to find for the defendants. 
In answering the second section of defendants' brief 
little need be added to what has already been said about 
the basic negligence of defendants in conducting large 
quantities of water upon the hillside of a steep canyon 
without taking reasonable precautions to see that it 
stayed within its conduit. The question was for the 
jury, and its verdict cannot properly be upset. The 
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defendants' evidence only showed that on the same 
night a second and larger rock hounded into the pipe 
at a point some 150 or 200 feet west of the break men-
tioned in the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses, causing 
a second break at a point where the pipe was going over 
a hill, and where it was lightly covered with soil and 
to some extent protected by the brow of a cut in which 
the pipe had been laid to keep -the grade over the hill 
lower. Defendants devote much argument to the pro-
position that they could not have forseen this break. 
Although we disagree, in view of the commonly known 
tendency of rolling rocks to bounce as they roll, we think 
this is immaterial. 
It seems clear from the evidence that the water 
which caused the damage in this case was released by 
the tvv-o rocks found by the witness Allred (T. 60-63) 
which were in a low uncovered, unprotected section of 
the pipe, and farther up-canyon. This hole was about 
two by three or four feet in size (T. 61), and because 
it was in a low spot the water at this point would be 
under greater pressure and would flow faster. The wit-
ness Farrell, who first saw the flood, drove through it 
and apparently never saw the great boulder which 
caused the break to which defendants' witnesses devoted 
their attention, although that boulder came to rest in 
the middle of the road, and was of such size as to be 
inescapable. The irresistable conclusion is that the 
brea.,k found by Allred, where the pipe was totally un-
protected came first, and c.aused the damage, and that 
the boulder so cherished by defendants came sometime 
after Farrell drove through. This conclusion is bolstered 
by the evidence of the witness Jesperson, who found 
water at the extreme upper edge of the flood, and only 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 or 40 feet \vest of the grocery store, high enough 
to stall him and cun1e up to the cushions of his car. He 
apparently sa\Y no rock in the road, although he saw 
enoug·h \Yater at this point to cause all the damage. 
\"'\: e submit that there 'Yas evidenee from which the 
jury would be justified in finding that the damage re-
sulted from tbe break caused by the smaller rocks des-
cribed by Allred, and \Yhich he found by tracing the 
flood to its source by the mud and debris left. That 
being the case it is idle to speculate here or to argue that 
the preponderance of evidence is the other way. This 
is a law case, and the facts are for the jury, which has 
found for the plaintiffs on competent evidence. There 
is ample evidence to show that the pipe was negligently 
constructed, operated and maintained at the point of this 
break. We submit that even the other break presented a 
jury question in the light of past experience with this 
slope. 
Defendants cite and rely on the case of 
Ward v. Salt Lake City 
46 Utah 616, 151 Pac. 905, 
to the effect that in the construction of public works 
a city's duty is discharged if it merely employs a com-
petent engineer to draw plans and then follows the plans. 
That rule is closely related to and apparently influenced 
by the rule of the immunity of the sovereigin. It is 
akin to the "public policy" theory under which charit-
able corporations are liable for the torts of their servants 
only if they are negligent in choosing and employing the 
servant. 10 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, §§4923 
and 4927. So far as we know the rule has never been 
extended, and we submit it should not be extended to 
situations such as this. 
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For here we do not have a municipal arm of the 
sovereign, a city government of, by, and for the people. 
Nor do we have a charitable corporation dispensing 
quasi-public charity without private profit. Here we 
have groups of men organized into corporations for 
private profit-for their own financial gain. To apply 
the doctrine of the Ward case here would be to let down 
the bars completely. The defendant Power Company 
could plead with quite equal logic that it was not res-
ponsible for the reckless driving of one of its truck 
drivers, because, forsooth, he had passed a driving test 
and submitted a chauffer's license before he was 
employed. 
Actually the Utah rule that a city is liable for 
failure to exercise due care in selecting an employee to 
-draft plans for a public improvement is a departure 
from the general ru1e that the adoption of plans is a 
governmental function in the performance of- which the 
city has the sovereign's immunity from tort liability. 
See 
38 Am. Jur. 328 and 336, "Municipal Corpor-
ations'' § § 628 and 634. 
It can have no application to the negligence of private 
corporations for profit. 
Defendants argue, however, that in fact the sov-
ereign United States of America planned and built the 
pipe in-· this case and, -as the rule would apply to the 
United States, that defendants can he liable only if 
the United States would he liable, as (it is claimed) they 
came into the picture '' o~nly after the pro.iect was com-
pleted." (Italics ours). Perhaps the most obvious thing 
wrong with this argument is that the facts are not as 
stated by defendants. 'The gov~rnment constructed 
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the pipeline pur~n1aut to and in accordance with a pre-
existing contract ''"ith the defendants specifying that 
the line should bt' buried only in the same manner as 
the Power Company's previous line (which had been 
broken by rocks) and under which the plans were sub· 
ject to the approral of the Power Company. See our 
statement of facts, page 1, supra. Thus defendants' con-
tract, for which they were responsible, required the 
government to construct the pipe in a way that defend-
ants kne'v was dang-erous. It is true that a government 
engineer drew the plans which were incorporated in the 
contract, but this "~ould not relieve the defendant cor-
porations of their duty to use due care in approving the 
plans. The government certainly would not have pro-
ceeded without the approval and cooperation of the 
defendants and their execution of the contract. The 
defendants had practical control, and as private cor-
poration sthey are responsible for their negligent exer-
cise thereof. 
~Ioreover, it is apparent that the engineer working 
on the plans was not left free to plan a safe conduit 
according- to his knowledge and experience, but was 
compelled to compromise safety factors with financial 
factors in order to gain the cooperation of defendants 
in the project. (T. 147-148.) It was decided that, in 
the interest of economy for defendants, the plaintiffs 
should be exposed to a risk of a _flood let loose by rolling 
stones \vhich should have been anticipated. Surely under 
these circumstances defendants should not be permitted 
to hide behind the skirts of the sovereign! If, to save 
themsPlves money, they knowingly exposed plaintiffs to 
danger of injury, they are responsible for that injury. 
They took the risk for plaintiffs, and now should take 
the consequences. 
17 
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Moreover, defendants' argument overlooks the fact 
that when the pipe was turned over to them the defect 
and danger was apparent, and it was negligent of them 
to fill the pipe with water without first correcting the 
dangerous defect. Even if it were conceded, for the 
argument's sake, that they were not responsible for the 
manner in which the pipe was constructed, still, having 
knowledge of that danger (which the engineer perhaps 
did not) they coursed a tremendous stream of water 
through the pipe without first taking precautions to see 
that it would not escape through the intervention of 
natural forces, and it was proper to submit the case 
to the jury. This is the rule even with respect to 
sovereign municipalities. ''As soon as the fault or 
injurious consequences are known, or ought to be known 
to the municipality, it is duty bound to remedy the defect, 
if this can be done, or, if not, to cease the operation of 
the pubZic agency until the defect is remedied; the penalty 
of refusal after reasonable notice will be liability in 
damages for the injuries caused by the defect.'' (Italics 
added.) 
38 Am. Jur. 329, "Municipal Corporations," 
§ 628, nt. 8. 
See also 
Morris v. Salt Lake City 
35 Utah 474, 101 Pac. 373, syllabus 9. 
It was there held that the ·city was liable for failure 
to remove trees left standing after their roots were cut 
by an independent sidewalk contractor, even if the 
cutting was a necessary incident to a proper plan for the 
sidewalk, where the city had kno"rledge of the danger 
created by the contractor's act and failed to corr.ect it 
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before the \Yind (a natural force, as here) blew the trees 
over. \V. e think this rase is exactly in point on the 
question of defendants' operational negligence. The 
eYidence is that this pipe "~as broken once before, and 
still defendants took no steps to remedy the patent defect. 
Defendants further argue that plaintiffs assumed 
the risk of injury by building· or buying a home under the 
pipeline after the pipe was constructed. This is of 
course tantamount to an assertion that by negligently 
building· their pipe the defendants acquired the right to 
forbid or prevent the normal and usual use of all land 
belo"~ the pipeline. That of course is not the law. If 
defendants wanted to take the land for use as a reservoir 
for flood waters released by their pipe when it should 
break, they should have condemned it and paid its fair 
value. The land was there for some hundreds of cen-
turies before the pipe was built, nor did defendants show 
that it was not in private ownership, with the incidental 
right to normal use, before any pipe was laid in Ogden 
Canyon. Defendants could not take away this right 
either directly or indirectly without compensation. 
The doctrine of assumed risk is applicable only 
w·here the injured person might reasonably elect whether 
to expose himself to th danger, and if he could not reason-
ably escape he assumes no risk. 
38 Am. J ur. 848, ''Negligence,'' § 173. 
Here the property owner could not pick up his land with 
the building on it and move it to a safer place. Building 
plots are not ambulatory. He could only avoid risk of 
injury by abandoning his property-which would itself 
be an injury suffered if the abandonment were forced by 
defendants' negligence. Plaintiffs were not reasonably 
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free to elect whether or not to expose themselves to the 
risk, especially in view of the well known housing 
shortage. 
Nor is a property owner bound to foreg·o the im-
provement of his land because the preexisting negligence 
of another makes it probable that the land and improve-
ments will be flooded and damaged. 
North Bend Lumber Company v. Seattle (Wash.) 
199 Pac. 988, 19 A.L.R. 415, 419; 
Annotation: 19 A.L.R. 423. 
Defendants urge also that they used reasonable care 
under the circumstances, and the fact that they did not 
use greater care will not render them liable The ques-
tion was submitted to the jury under proper instructions 
to determine whether defendants exercised the care 
a reasonably prudent man would have exercised under 
the circumstances. The ju,ry, by its verdict, has found 
that defendants did not act with ordinary caution. The 
evidence described in considerable detail the history of 
the breakage of exposed water pipes in Ogden Canyon, 
and the experience of Ogden City before and after it 
buried its parallel pipe. It was for the jury to say 
whether defendants used reasonable care under the 
circumstanees. 
Defendants also seem to intimate-that the rock here 
was so large that no precaution could have avoided the 
break-that the rock was, in effect, a vis major. But we 
have already pointed out that there was evidence that 
the damage in fact came from two very ordinary rocks. 
The court instructed the jury that defendants were not 
required to prepare to meet unlooked for and over-
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"?helming· di~plays of adverse power of such nature· as 
to surprise eautiou~ and reasonable men. (R. 062) Ap-
parently the jury \Yas of the opinion either that the 
smaller rocks did the damage, or that reasonable men 
'vould not have been surprised or overwhelmed by the 
large one, and that reasonable protection of the pipe 
'vould have averted the break. In any event, it was a 
question for the jury. We have already referred to the 
principle that negligence concurring with an act of God 
to produce injury is actionable. 
We submit the court did not err in denying defend-
ants' motion for a directed verdict and refusing their 
requested instruction number one. 
3. The lotver court did not err in refusing defend-
ants' requested instructions Nos. 9 and 14. 
(a) Defendants' request No. 9 which would have 
charged that defendants were not required to anticipate 
that a rock would be broken from a certain cliff ''and 
therefore plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover'' is 
clearly improper, and was properly refused. Whether 
an ordinary prudent man would forsee the severance 
of the rock would in any event be for the jury. More-
over, the question of the breaking of the rock from any 
particular cliff is utterly irrelevant. The question really 
involved was whether a reasonbaly prudent man would 
have foreseen the danger from rolling or bounding rocks 
from whatever source on the hillside above. In view 
of previous experience in evidence it seems clear that 
such a man would have anticipated that rocks would 
roll over and into an exposed pipe. Such rocks were 
common experience. To say that a man is not negligent 
because he could not in advance place his finger upon the 
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particular rock destined to break the pipe is obviously 
wrong. The forseeability of the terminus, not the source 
of rolling rocks on this mountainside, was the point in 
issue. Moreover, the distance to the cliff is immaterial, 
so long as the slope from the cliff to the pipe· is uninter-
rupted, as it is. Defendants are not ·entitled to assume 
that a rock, once started rolling, would just become 
tired and stop after so many hundred feet. Moving 
rocks rarely stop on a slope. 
(b) Defendants' Requested instruction No. 14 deals 
with proximate cause. It would have instructed in effect, 
that ,if the flood waters released from defendants' pipe 
would have missed plaintiffs' home "hut for" the plow-
ing of the snow from the state highway so as to make a 
channel of the road, plaintiffs can't recover. In their 
argument on this point defendants say, "·Under norrnal 
conditions it [the water] would have flowed from the 
highway and into the river long before it reached plain-
tiffs' property." (Italics added.) That statement is 
entirely without support in the evidence. On the con-
trary, all the evidence was that the situation at the time 
of the accident was entirely normal. The evidence with-
out any conflict was that the winter snows were always 
plowed out of the road in the same manner. This was 
well known. As defendants' superintendent in charge of 
the pipeline testified, that was done every year, and 
was a condition known to everyone; it exists on all can-
yon roads. (T. 245-246.) That this is normal is further 
shown by defendants' own photographic exhibits, taken 
the following February, and showing a similar, but even 
more extreme, channel. In other words, this channel, 
which defendants would have the court regard as an 
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interYeniug eausP. \ras part of the normal topography 
of thl• area every year during· the season of rolling rocks. 
Defendants \Yere not entitled to assume that it would be 
other·w·ise, or thnt it \vould not carry escaping waters 
down the roa.dvfay from a break at this or any other 
point above the road. 
Defendants' argument is thus seen to rest upon a 
false assumption of fact: namely, that the "normal" 
condition of the road '"'as freedom from snow which had 
been plo\Yed into banks. Quite the contrary \Vas true 
under all the evidence, and the arg·ument falls with the 
false assumption on which it was based. There was 
nothing in the evidence on which to base the giving of 
the requested instruction, and it was properly refused. 
~Ioreover, the intervention of independent inter-
vening causes \Yill not break the casual connection if the 
intervention of such forces was itself probable or 
forseea ble. 
38 Am. Jur. 727, "Negligence" 
§70, nt. 4 
Here the practice of plowing of the road and its pro-
bably result were vvelr known to defendants. The de-
fendant Power Company's pipe had previously broken 
and the \vater had flo\ved down the road for 1,000 feet. 
(T. 38-39.) And even if the plowed-out road had been 
an abnormal rather than a normal winter and early 
spring condition, still the requested instruction would 
have been improper because it ignores the question as to 
whether such condition was forseeable. It states without 
qualification that if the ""ater was channelled to plain-
tiffs' property by the plowed road, the verdict must be 
for defendants. That is not the law, as we have pointed 
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out. Hence the request, as framed, was properly re-
fused even if there had been (as there was not) evidence 
on which a proper instruction on this detail of probable 
cause might have been based. 
In effect the annual plowing of the road was not 
an intervening cause, but a pre-existing topographical 
condition, of which defendants had knowledge, and which 
merely set the stage for defendants' negligence, as did 
the steep, rocky mountainside. But even if the plowing 
each year should he deemed a new act, unrelated to the 
pre-existence of the highway and the annual sno,vs, 
still it was a lawful and proper act for the highway 
officials to do, and being without fault, it would not be, 
1n law, an efficient intervening proximate cause. 
38 Am. J ur. 732, "Negligence," § 73, nt. 4. 
Nor can the plowing of the road he logically classed 
as an efficient intervening cause. It could not have 
flooded the Knight home; it_ produced no water. At 
most it would be a concurring cause. And the rule that 
where the negligence of two tort feasors concurs to pro-
duce an injury they are jointly and severally liable is 
too well known to require citation of authority. How-
ever, see 
45 C. J. 920. 
See also 
Coleman v. Bennett 
69 s. w. 734, 735, 
a case extraordinar~ly like the one at bar on this question 
of proximate cause. There the defendant \vrongfully 
danimed a stream. ~ubsequently a third party built a 
levee along· the reservoir so formed. During a freshet 
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the levee \Yashed out, and the debris therefrom, drifting 
downstream on the released \Vaters, formed obstructions 
\Yhich threw the \raters on plaintiff's lands. Without 
the dam the \Vaters 'vould not have been thrown against 
the third party's levee. Without the obstructions which 
came from the levee the water would have flowed harm-
lessly down the -natural channel after leaving the dam. 
It was held that the dam was a proximate cause of the 
injury, uninterrupted by the construction of the third 
party's levee, and the defendant was liable even though 
no injury would have resulted without the concurring 
act of the third party. 
We submit that the defendants' request No. 14 was 
properly refused. The quotation from 
Rollow v. Og·den City 
66 Utah 475, 243 Pac. 791, 
in defendants' brief (pp. 39-40) is not applicable, for 
the reason that there was no evidence of a ''new or in-
dependent" cause, but only, at most, of a normal con-
dition whicvh was a ''concurring'' cause, of which de-
fendants had full knowledge in advance. 
4. The lower court did not err in its instructions 
1, 5, 9, 10, or 12. 
(a) As to Instru.ction No. 1. 
-Defendants complain of the court's instruction out-
lining the issues because it stated plaintiffs' allegation 
that ' ' defendants carelessly and negligently left the 
said pipe lying unprotected upon the surface of the 
ground,'' contending that there was no evidence to go 
to the jury on that _issue, as (so defendants say) the 
evidence showed the pipe was protected by the brow 
of a cut and by six inches of earth. 
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In the first place, there was evidence that the pipe 
was uncovered at the point of the easterly break which 
caused the injury. The witness Allred testified that at 
the point of the break and for several rods east the 
pipe was completely bare, and lying on top of the ground. 
(T. 62-64). That was not dispu.ted. And whether the. 
brow of the cut at the point of the subsequent break re-
ferred to by defendants, and a mere six inches of dirt, 
were "protection" was properly for the jury. There 
was no error in outlining the allegation and the denial, 
especially where, as here, the trial court's attention was 
not timely invited to defendants' claim by a suitable 
request for an instruction withdrawing that issue. 
Defendants also complain of the sentence in which 
the court states plaintiffs' allegation that defend-
ants knew or should have known that every s-pring frost 
loosened rocks roll down the mountainside and across 
the location of the pipe. This seems highly technical, 
and could not have confused the jury, especially in view 
of the fact that the paragraph in question was initiated 
with the words ''The plaintiffs in their complaint allege 
... '', the immediately ensuing paragraph hegins ''Plain-
tiffs further allege . . . '', and the instruction concludes 
''You are instructed that the foregoing allegations and 
denials are not to be considered by you as statements 
of fact . . . '' We should presume that jurors are of 
ordinary intellig·ence, and clearly no ordinary intellect 
cognizant of the ordinary uses of the English language 
would be misled by the instruction. Moreover, the error, 
if any, was harmless, for on the trial the servants and 
agents of the defendants admitted the knowledge alleged. 
The instruction might well be upheld as a proper 
statement of the law, for it is the law that everyone 
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must take notice n t his peTil of such ordinary results 
of the operation of physical laws as the effect of the 
force of gra,Tity ou objects subject thereto, or the effect 
of a tha"'T on a frozen mass on a slope. 
38 Am. Jur. 712, "Negligence"§ 60. 
We believe the defendants are bound in law to know 
this phenomenon of springtime in the Rockies. However 
it is not necessary to go so far to hold this assignment 
of error is not well taken. 
(b) As to Instruction No. 5. 
Surely there is no merit to this assignment of error. 
Defendants complain that the court's general instruction 
on proximate cause was not qualifiied hy the statement 
that proximate c.ause must be operative '' w.ithout the 
intervention of any new or independen.t carus-e.'' How-
ever the court did instruct that proximate cause is ''that 
cause which, in a natural and eontinuous sequence, 
unbroken by an eff'i~cient intervening cause, produces the 
injury . . . " (Italics added.) The cour-t ·gave the 
substance of what defendants contend for, and there is 
no particular or peculiar virtue in the exact phrase-
ology employed by defendants or by this court in the 
Rollow case, supra. 
Moreoer, asv we have heretofore pointed out, there 
was here no evidence on 'vhich an instruction on inter-
vening cause could properly be based. It follows that 
any error which might have been eommitted in this re-
gard was non-prejudicial. 
The court's instruction, may we add by_ way of 
post-script, is a stock instruction taken from a definition 
having the most general approva~. See 
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45 C. J. 898, note 15. 
·(c) As to Instruction No.9. 
This instruction is taken almost verba tim from the 
very carefully considered and worded statement of this 
court in one of its leading cases, that of 
Lisonbee v. Monr·oe Irrigation Company 
18 Utah 343, 54 Pac. 1009. 
We submit that it correctly states the law of this state 
applicable to the facts of this case. 
Defendants complain of the first paragraph as ''a 
purely gratuitous theoretical observation ... which has 
no plac.e in instructions of law." We submit that it 
states a matter of c.omrnon knowledge of which the court 
takes judicial notice, and which furnishes, a perfectly 
proper introductory statement and background to assist 
the, jury in a· proper understanding and application' of 
the balance of that and other instructions. · There· is no 
error here-and even if there .were it could not possibly 
be prejudicial. 
Defendants do not complain that the second para-
graph of Instruc.tion No. 9 does not correctly state the 
law applicable to this ease. Their complaint is only 
that the court, having instructed (.No. 7, R. 061) that the 
·jury could not find for the plaintiff unless it found the 
pipeline was negligently constructed, now instructed fur-
ther regarding negligent use. It is conceded, however, 
that defendants were in fact using the pipe to conduct 
large quantities of water along the mountainside, and 
(as there wa·s ample evidenc.e) they were doing so after 
more than adequate knowledge of the dangerous defect 
and opportunity to correct it. The error, if any, was 
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committed in g·iving instruction No. 7, and was prejudi-
cial to plaintiffs, not defendants. As we have heretofore 
pointed out, defendants, \vhether or not they were re-
sponsible for the negligent planning and construction of 
the pipe, \vere in any event under a duty not to use the 
pipe until they had remedied the defect. The danger, 
of course, \vas apparent to all \Yho were not blinded to 
it by the desire to keep down the cost of construction. 
They had notice, but consciously discounted it to save 
a dollar-at the expense of the Knights. 
1'he court properly instructed the Jury as to the 
use of the pipeline. 
(d) As to Instruction No. 10. 
Here again defendants do not complain that the 
instruction improperly states the law (see Mackay v. 
Breeze, supra) but only that the instruction permits 
consideration of their negligent use and operation there-
of. This, as we have demonstrated in the immediately 
preceding paragraphs hereof, was perfectly proper under 
the pleadings and the evidence. In view of the con-
struction of the line, any operation thereof for coursing 
a large flow of water was negligent. There was no 
error committed here. 
(e) As to Instruction No. 12. 
As to subparagraphs (c) and (h) of Instruction 12, 
the plaintiffs prayed for $375.00 damages by reason of 
the destrnct,io·n of many items of clothing, and $50.00 
for repairs to clothing which could be salvaged. There 
"·as uncontroverted evidence introduced in support of 
and clearly 1·elated to each claim separately. The court's 
instructions obviously related to these two items, as was 
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apparent to anyone who had heard the evidence. We 
submit that there was· no error, but that if their was it 
was prejudicial only to the plaintiffs. 
As to subparagraphs (f) and ( j) of Instruction 12, 
they obviously relate to two separate items of damage: 
The former to the cost of repairs made to the furniture, 
and the second to the damage ' ' beyond repair,'' that is, 
the depreciation still existing after repairs, and which 
repairs could not o bvia.te. A ''repaired'' article is~ 
never worth as much as it was before it needed repair. 
It is apparent that in the light of the issues and the 
evidence, these instructions could not have misled the 
jury, and no prejudicial error was committed. 
While we are eonfident that the judgment below 
shuold and will be affirmed, we are sensible that in every 
law suit the confidence of counsel on one or the other 
side in his case must in the end turn out to be _without 
adequate foundation. Because we recognize the (re-
mote, we believe) possibility that there /\viii be a re-trial 
of this case, we venture to suggest that in such event 
the guidance of this eourt on a matter of the admis-
sibility of .some tendered evidence would he helpful to the 
court below, and might avoid the necessity for a second 
appeal. 
At the trial below plaintiffs- offered to prove by the 
witness Allred (the Attorney in fact for Mr. Knight, who 
was overseas) that in a conversation about this accident 
with Mr. R. R. Rowell, who was then ''Division Man-
ager'' of defendant Power Company for the area em-
bracing the territory in question, the Division Manager 
told the witness, in sn bstance and effect, that Allred 
should tell Mr. and Mrs-. Knight ''that the Company 
~0 
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\rould see that thPy \Yere taken care of.'' ( T. 70, 71; 99.) 
The offer \Yas refn8ed and the evidence excluded on de-
fendant Po\ver Company's objection that there was no 
~ho\Ying of authority to bind the company. We submit 
that from the conferring of the title and duties of a 
District ~Ianager, and in the absence of rebutting evi-
dence, the authority is implied to make binding admis-
sions of fault and liability for matters within the terri-
tory allotted to such a managing agent. 
,Johnson Y. Yost Lumber Company 
117 Fed. 2d 53, 59. 
This case contains an excellent discussion of the policy 
and principles involved. And if there is any evidence, 
then the matter becomes a question for the jury under 
proper instructions. 
See 
Goddard v. Lexington 1\IIotor Company 
63 Utah161, 223 Pac. 340. 
We trust, however, that the court will agree that 
no substantial error prejudicial to the defendants was 
committed by the learned judge below, and that it will 
affirm the judgment. We submit that under the law 
and the evidence it should do so. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THATCHER & YOUNG 
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